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The D.C. Circuit’s 2015 opinion, Cause of Action v. Federal Trade 
Commission, authored by its Chief Judge, Merrick Garland, is a landmark 
pro-transparency opinion that held an executive branch agency accountable for 
misreading two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) fee provisions.  In addition 
to its contribution to the news media and public interest FOIA requester 
communities, the opinion evidences a pervasive methodological flaw in the 
congressional approach to FOIA reform.  The FOIA statute is inefficient because 
it invites and requires agency interpretation of key provisions, which is 
inconsistent with its non-deferential de novo standard of review.  Given the 
natural disincentives executive branch agencies have to comply with the 
oversight and transparency efforts of news media and public interest actors, 
agencies exploit FOIA in a manner that is contrary to its public policy goals.  
This statutory problem survives the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016.  This 
Article makes the case that Congress should approach FOIA reform with greater 
legislative precision to better achieve its public policy goals.  FOIA is unique 
among legislative enactments because it is an omnibus statute of transparency 
                                                 
 + Professorial Lecturer of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  I was counsel for 
Plaintiff-Appellant in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission, a D.C. Circuit case that this 
article examines.  To maintain objectivity, my co-author and I cite to the commentary of others 
when examining potentially subjective conclusions regarding this case.  I am grateful to Dick 
Pierce, Paul Verkuil, Margaret Kwoka, Alan Morrison, Allan Blutstein, David Fischer and James 
Valvo for their insights and comments throughout the drafting process. 
 ++ J.D., George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, B.A., Saint Joseph’s University. 
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and oversight, organic to no agency, and one that creates powerful disincentives 
for agency compliance with its goals.  Its de novo standard of review conveys 
an absence of deference that is in tension with its provisions that delegate agency 
interpretative authority. 
The academy and jurists alike vigorously debate many aspects of 
administrative law.  Notwithstanding the numerous disagreements that exist in 
the intellectual discourse, there is consensus on the maxim that agency 
interpretation of a statute that is generally applicable to all executive branch 
agencies should not vary.1 Congress consistently ignores this convention by 
choosing to craft FOIA and its amendments in broad language that invites and 
requires agency interpretation.  This phenomenon recently presented itself in 
Chief Judge Merrick Garland’s 2015 D.C. Circuit opinion in Cause of Action v. 
Federal Trade Commission.2  In that case, the court held an executive branch 
agency accountable for misreading two FOIA fee provisions in response to a 
FOIA request that sought a fee waiver based on public interest factors and 
recognition of the requester as a representative of the news media.3  Such 
statutory misreadings resulted in significant delays that caused harm to the 
requestor.4  Improper delays in releasing records and improper withholdings of 
records frustrate the twin public policy pillars of FOIA, transparency and 
oversight.5  Agencies are disinclined to promote transparency and oversight 
because doing so invites unwanted scrutiny and adverse consequences. 
                                                 
 1. See Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is precisely because 
FOIA’s terms apply government-wide that we generally decline to accord deference to agency 
interpretations of the statute, as we would otherwise do under Chevron.”). 
2.  Cause of Action v. FTC, 799 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  Chief Judge Merrick Garland 
listed this case first in a list of the ten most significant opinions that he authored while on the D.C. 
Circuit as part of a Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees that he provided to the United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary in furtherance of his nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.  UNITED 
STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES 59-
60, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senate%20Judiciary%20Committee%20Que 
stionnaire%205%209%202016.pdf [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES]; see 
Emmarie Huetteman, Merrick Garland Completes Nominee Questionnaire for the Senate, N.Y.  
TIMES (May 10, 2016, 5:47 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/05/10/merrick-
garland-completes-nominee-questionnaire-for-the-senate/?_r=0. 
 3. See Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1126. 
 4. See Related Documents: Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission, CAUSE OF 
ACTION (Apr. 29, 2014), http://causeofaction.org/related-documents-cause-action-v-federal-trade-
commission/ (describing the time delay between Cause of Action’s original FOIA request and the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion). 
 5. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1363, 1369 (2016). 
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While Congress permits6 and requires7 agency interpretation of numerous 
FOIA terms and provisions, it imposes a non-deferential de novo standard of 
review to agency rulemakings and adjudications made under the statute.8  Such 
standard of review is appropriate for a statute of general agency applicability 
because it conveys an absence of authoritative delegation.  This Article proposes 
that the de novo standard of review provision of FOIA is diminished by the 
inefficiency and tension created by the statute’s interpretive delegations, which 
are typically reviewed under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9  The result of 
the inefficiency is diminished efficacy that survives the latest decennial 
amendment to the FOIA statute, the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016.10  To 
resolve the discrepancy between agency interpretation and de novo review, this 
Article makes the case that Congress should approach FOIA reform with greater 
legislative precision.11 
Part I identifies the adverse public policy effects of Congress’s choice to 
confer non-deferential interpretive authority of FOIA upon agencies, coupled 
with the natural disincentives agencies have to exercise such interpretive 
authority to promote compliance with the statute.  Part II examines the tension 
and inefficiency of FOIA’s judicial review provisions in the context of the 
broader statutory scheme of agency-delegated interpretation.  It suggests that 
courts may not be reviewing FOIA adjudications and rules de novo as a result of 
this inefficiency.  Part III addresses various counterarguments and alternatives 
to our views. 
                                                 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa) (2012) (conferring discretion to engage in rulemaking 
to determine administrative appeal deadline in excess of ninety day statutory minimum); id. § 
552(a)(6)(B)(iv) (conferring permissive individual authority to aggregate certain classes of requests 
to reduce duplication of processing efforts); id. § 552(a)(6)(D)(i) (conferring permissive individual 
agency authority to engage in rulemaking to incorporate and interpret multitrack processing). 
 7. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (requiring agencies to engage in interpretive rulemaking regarding 
circumstances that merit expedited processing of requests). 
 8. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). District courts must also review any action challenging an agency 
determination regarding fee waivers de novo.  See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii); Cause of Action, 799 
F.3d at 1115 (citing Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (“FOIA 
. . . requires the court ‘to determine the matter de novo,’ . . . and courts ‘owe no particular deference 
to [an agency’s] interpretation of FOIA.’”); Al–Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“[B]ecause FOIA’s terms apply government-wide[,] . . . we generally decline to accord deference 
to agency interpretations of the statute, as we would otherwise do under Chevron.”). 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The ‘scope of review’ 
provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)[(A)–(D)], are cumulative.”). 
 10. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016). 
 11. This Article does not suggest that Congress engage in unconstitutionally precise 
legislative drafting so as to create irrebuttable presumptions.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (finding an irrebuttable presumption unconstitutional as a 
violation of due process). 
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I. THE INEFFICIENCY OF FOIA DELEGATIONS WITH DE NOVO REVIEW 
Congress enacted FOIA principally as a tool of executive branch agency 
oversight.12  While other statutes applicable to administrative agencies contain 
oversight provisions,13 FOIA is unique in that its purpose is to facilitate 
transparency and oversight of agencies.14  That oversight function creates natural 
tension with agencies that have disincentives to liberally comply with FOIA’s 
goals and purposes.15  When agencies do not comply with FOIA’s mandates, 
information is withheld from the public, requesters face long delays from 
agencies forcing litigation to ensure compliance, and the purpose of the statute 
is frustrated.16  The problem is compounded by agency motivation to withhold 
records that are harmful, embarrassing, or politically inconvenient.17  FOIA 
                                                 
 12. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of 
FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”); see also Karen 
A. Winchester & James W. Zirkle, Freedom of Information and the CIA Information Act, 21 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 231, 297 (1987) (“[I]t is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended 
FOIA to serve primarily as an oversight function.”); Joan M. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: 
Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1970) (“The 
Freedom of Information Act was passed to ‘pierce the paper curtain of bureaucracy’ that shields 
federal government operations from public view.” (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1966) 
(remarks of Congressman Laird))). 
 13. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 679, 685 (2002) (“In drafting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) scope of 
review provisions Congress sought to bring order to the oversight function.”). 
 14. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–
73 (1989) (“[D]emocracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their 
government is up to.” (emphasis removed) (internal citations omitted)); U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (identifying FOIA’s basic purpose as “to open agency action to the 
light of public scrutiny”); see also Kwoka, supra note 5, at 1363 (“[N]o law is more centrally 
intended to promote transparency as a means of democratic governance than FOIA.”). 
 15. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (“[S]ince the statute’s purpose—disclosure 
of certain information held by the government—creates tension with the understandable reluctance 
of government agencies to part with that information, Congress intended that the primary 
interpretive responsibilities rest on the judiciary, whose institutional interests are not in conflict 
with that statutory purpose.”); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, FOIA 
IS BROKEN: A REPORT 2 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT] (“Many…[FOIA 
issues] are engineered into the process by the federal agencies themselves.”); Margaret B. Kwoka, 
Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 186 (2013) (“A FOIA withholding is different from 
other agency actions in important ways: it is one of the few administrative actions in which the 
agency’s own illegitimate self-interest is often at stake . . . .”). 
 16. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Conference of the United States and its Work 
on the Freedom of Information Act: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1540, 1545 (2015) (“[W]riting a law mandating disclosure, with limited exceptions, is only the first 
step; people who have control over requested records must cooperate or the system will not work 
as intended.”). 
 17. FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, supra note 15, at 9 (“[T]he agencies applying the 
exemptions have an inherent conflict of interest. The agency making the decision to withhold 
information is also the agency with the most at stake if embarrassing or controversial information 
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would be a more effective statute if Congress filled many of its gaps that invite 
or permit agency interpretation, and filled the space created by its ambiguities.18 
A. Executive Branch Disincentives to Compliance 
Executive branch disincentives to comply with the provisions and purposes of 
FOIA can cause individual agencies to interpret the statute’s ambiguities and 
gaps narrowly and in favor of nondisclosure.19  Judicial correction of such 
agency behavior took place in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission.20  
In that case, the Cause of Action Institute, a non-profit oversight organization, 
filed three successive, superseding, FOIA requests with the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), seeking information that it intended to 
use to develop investigative reports that could be critical of the Commission.21 
Cause of Action sought a fee waiver by asserting that the request was seeking 
information “in the public interest,” and, alternatively, a fee classification that 
would result in a reduction of fees by asserting that it was a “representative of 
                                                 
is released.”); see Morrison, supra note 16, at 1546 (“But it is precisely those documents whose 
disclosure is not in the interest of at least some officials that FOIA makes available as a matter of 
law.” (emphasis added)); Kwoka, supra note 15, at 202 (“Agencies have often been found to have 
failed to release records to cover up their mistakes, embarrassing acts, or misconduct.”); see also 
Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 469 (2015). 
Even though President Obama declared in his memorandum on FOIA that ‘the 
Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials 
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or 
because of speculative or abstract fears,’ agencies continue to invoke exemptions as 
frequently as in the past, if not more often. 
Id. 
 18. See FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, supra note 15, at 39 (“[U]nresponsive agencies lack 
effective incentives to make improvement . . . [l]egislation is needed to clarify existing 
requirements and impose additional requirements that will ensure agencies to comply with legal 
obligations to make government public.”); Morrison, supra note 16, at 1549 (“The bureaucracy will 
never be enthusiastic about FOIA, but it is worth exploring alternatives that will overcome the 
inevitable resistance without harming significant interests that are protected by FOIA’s legitimate 
exemptions.”). 
 19. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 6 
(2001) (rejecting agency posture that certain documents were exempt from disclosure on the basis 
that they were “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters” protected by the work-
product and deliberative process privileges); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 
139 (1989) (rejecting the DOJ’s claim that it could deny requests on the basis that the requested tax 
opinions and final orders were not agency records); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 258–59 
(1975) (agency denying a request for reports on the basis that they were “exempt from public 
disclosure”); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Office of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, 827 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (rejecting agency posture meant to shield government documents from disclosure due to their 
storage on a private email server). 
 20. Cause of Action v. FTC, 799 F.3d 1108, 1110–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Chief Judge Merrick 
Garland stated that the court’s opinion in this case represented one of the most significant opinions 
he authored while on the D.C. Circuit. See QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES, supra note 
2. 
 21. Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1110–14. 
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the news media.”22  Relying on its own regulatory interpretations of the 
respective fee classifications, the second of which parroted the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) 1987 Uniform Freedom of Information Act 
Fee Schedule and Guidelines,23 the FTC denied Cause of Action’s fee requests.24 
A district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC, relying upon 
the agency’s regulations and other legal interpretations.25 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the lower court’s—and by 
extension, the agency’s—erroneous interpretations of the fee classifications.26  
With regard to the public interest fee waiver, the Court stated that while “[t]he 
FTC regulation cited by the district court does require a requester to show that 
the information it seeks would increase the understanding of the public ‘at 
large[,]’ . . . FOIA itself does not.”27  Upon analyzing the FTC’s interpretation 
of the “representative of the news media” fee classification, the court identified 
two problems with the FTC’s regulation and the district court’s decision.  First, 
the FTC and district court required that each FOIA request be of potential 
interest to a segment of the public—yet, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
proper test focused on whether the requester gathers information of potential 
interest to a segment of the public.28  Second, the FTC and the district court 
employed the FTC’s erroneous and OMB-parroted interpretation of the fee 
classification, requiring that the requester be “organized especially around 
dissemination,”29 an interpretive requirement that was superseded by the OPEN 
Government Act of 2007.30  That statute provided a definition of the 
                                                 
 22. Id. at 1110–11; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II), (iii) (2012). 
 23. Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1125; compare 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2)(iii) (2016) (regarding 
eligibility for a news media fee classification) with The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 
1986: Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 
10,018 (Mar. 27, 1987) [hereinafter FOIA of 1986 Fee Schedule and Guidelines] (regarding 
eligibility for a news media fee classification). 
 24. Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1111. 
 25. Id. at 1113–15 (note, however, that the District Court denied the fee classifications for 
Cause of Action’s first two requests, and held the fee waiver request for its third FOIA request to 
be moot, because the third FOIA request essentially repeated its first two FOIA requests). 
 26. See id. at 1114–15, 1126; see also Adam Marshall, Shall I Compare Thee to a 
Newspaper?, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Summer 2015), 
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-
2015/shall-i-compare-thee-newspa. 
 27. Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1115. The Court also noted that, in 2004, it specifically held 
that “proof of the ability to disseminate the released information to a broad cross-section of the 
public is not required.”  Id. at 1116 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 
1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 28. Id. at 1120–21 (“Such a case-by-case approach is correct for the public-interest waiver 
test, which requires that the ‘disclosure of the [requested] information’ be in the public interest.  
But the news-media waiver, by contrast, focuses on the nature of the requester, not its request.”). 
 29. Id. at 1125 (citing FOIA of 1986 Fee Schedule and Guidelines, supra note 23). 
 30. See OPEN Government Act of 2007, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). 
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“representative of the news media fee” category that varied from the OMB 
guidelines and the FTC’s interpretation.31 
For nearly ten years, FOIA has entitled an individual or organization to a 
“news media” fee status if the requester: “[(1)] gathers information of potential 
interest [(2)] to a segment of the public, [(3)] uses its editorial skills to turn the 
raw materials into a distinct work, and [(4)] distributes that work [(5)] to an 
audience.”32  After the commencement of litigation in Cause of Action, the FTC 
promulgated a new “representative of the news media” fee regulation that 
conformed to the 2007 FOIA amendment.33  Nonetheless, it continued to press 
the validity of its prior regulation in litigation. 
The D.C. Circuit concluded that while some of the FTC’s problems could be 
attributed to FOIA amendments that had not yet been interpreted by the courts, 
it held the agency accountable for employing erroneous FOIA interpretations.34  
Given the court’s rebuke in Cause of Action, it is reasonable to infer that the 
FTC wrongfully denied advantageous fee classifications to other requesters even 
though they were entitled to those classifications for quite some time, and in so 
doing, stifled transparency.35  Less than one year later, a different D.C. Circuit 
panel held another agency accountable for misreading another portion of the 
same FOIA fee provision,36 one that advantages educational institutions that are 
engaging in scholarly research.37  In Sack v. United States Department of 
Defense,38 the court once more rejected an agency regulation that parroted the 
OMB’s Reagan-era 1987 guidelines, though the interpretation had not been 
superseded by statute.39  The court disagreed with the government’s narrow 
reading of the term “educational institution” that permitted teachers, but 
excluded students, from taking advantage of the fee classification provision.40  
These two recently-decided cases aptly demonstrate the inefficiencies and 
adverse effects on transparency caused by Congress’s FOIA drafting choices. 
                                                 
 31. See id.; see also Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1118–20. 
 32. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III); see also Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1120; Nat’l 
Sec. Archive v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (creating the test that 
was eventually codified into FOIA). 
 33. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2)(iii) (2016). 
 34. Cause of Action, 799 F.3d at 1115; see also Josh Gerstein, Court Upholds Broad FOIA 
Fee Exemption For Media & Groups, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://www. 
politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2015/08/court-upholds-broad-foia-fee-exemption-for-media-
groups-212930#ixzz4GT52XdMr. 
 35. Christopher Mathias, How Merrick Garland Made It Harder for Obama to Be So 
Secretive, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry 
/merrick-garland-government-transparency-foia_us_56e99318e4b065e2e3d821f3 (“These fees 
can be ridiculously, prohibitively expensive—sometimes costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
if not millions.”). 
 36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). 
 37. Sack v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 823 F.3d 687–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 38. Id. at 687. 
 39. Id. at 692–93. 
 40. Id. at 688. 
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B. FOIA Reform and Executive Stonewalling 
Although Congress acted in 2007 to carefully define the “news media” fee 
waiver category,41 it failed to define other FOIA provisions with similar 
clarity.42  It amended FOIA again on June 30, 2016, by enacting the FOIA 
Improvement Act of 2016, which (1) requires agencies to automatically make 
electronically available any records which have been requested (and produced) 
at least three times, (2) codifies the Department of Justice’s “reasonably 
foreseeable harm” standard,43 (3) forbids agencies from assessing search fees if 
they miss production deadlines,44 and (4) mandates creation of a consolidated 
online request portal for all agencies.45  These provisions undoubtedly contribute 
to FOIA’s goal of open government.  They also fail to address agency 
interpretive error and interpretive variance with respect to the statute’s46 gaps 
and ambiguities.47  Until Congress enacts much more specific FOIA provisions, 
                                                 
 41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). 
 42. See generally FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016). 
 43. Id. § 2, 130 Stat. at 538-39.  In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder repealed a former 
DOJ mandate and declared that DOJ would only defend an agency’s FOIA denial if “(1) the agency 
reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory 
exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law.” Memorandum from the Attorney General for 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdf (stating that DOJ would defend 
agency withholdings “unless they lack[ed] a sound legal basis or present[ed] an unwarranted risk 
of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records”). 
 44. Id. § 2, 130 Stat. at 538.  This provision also waives duplication fees for educational, 
noncommercial scientific, scientific research, and representatives of the news media requesters if 
an agency misses a deadline.  See id. 
 45. Id. § 2, 130 Stat. at 544; OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (last updated Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-
improvement-act-2016. The amendment also codified a “sunset provision” which makes the 
deliberative process privilege inapplicable to records created over twenty-five years before they are 
requested.  See § 2, 130 Stat. at 540. 
 46. See generally § 2, 130 Stat. at 538.  The Obama administration also strongly lobbied 
against more stringent FOIA reform.  Jason Leopold, It Took a FOIA Lawsuit to Uncover How the 
Obama Administration Killed FOIA Reform, VICE NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016, 9:50 AM), https://news. 
vice.com/article/it-took-a-foia-lawsuit-to-uncover-how-the-obama-administration-killed-foia-
reform; Trevor Timm, New Documents Show the Obama Administration Aggressively Lobbied to 
Kill Transparency Reform in Congress, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUNDATION (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://freedom.press/news-advocacy/new-documents-show-the-obama-admin-aggressive 
ly-lobbied-to-kill-transparency-reform-in-congress/ (detailing how the Obama administration 
lobbied against a 2014 bill that would have given Congress more oversight to ensure agencies were 
complying with FOIA). 
 47. For example, FOIA confers discretion to agencies regarding whether to implement the 
multitrack processing of requests based on the volume of work or time required in responding to a 
request.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(D) (2012) (stating that agencies can “provid[e] for multitrack processing 
of requests for records based on the amount of work or time (or both) involved in processing 
requests.”).  The idea behind multitrack processing is that “larger numbers of requests for smaller 
amounts of material will be completed more quickly,” and “[r]equesters will also have an incentive 
to frame narrower requests.”  Introduction to FOIA, FOIADVOCATES, http://www. 
foiadvocates.com/intro.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).  The absence of consistent multitracking 
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requesters will continue to be wrongfully denied records or improperly assessed 
fees based on erroneous agency interpretations. 
Further illustrating the point that agencies have strong disincentives to comply 
with FOIA, presidential administrations have vehemently opposed and even 
lobbied against congressional efforts to enact FOIA reform.  President Lyndon 
Johnson’s administration fought hard to stall the statute’s original enactment in 
the 1960s, as did every agency that offered congressional testimony on the 
legislation that would become FOIA.48 Despite executive branch resistance, 
FOIA passed both houses of Congress by a nearly unanimous margin.49 In his 
signing statement, President Johnson emphasized the need for government 
secrecy more so than for open government.50 
Strong presidential opposition to FOIA and transparency reform measures 
persists.51  Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama lobbied against FOIA 
reform.52  President Bush, while indicating that his administration was 
“committed to full compliance with” FOIA,53 issued Executive Order 13233, 
which limited public access to former presidential administration records under 
                                                 
of requests across the government can lead some agencies to permit less work-intensive requests to 
languish while spending countless hours processing a time-consuming request.  Congress should 
mandate multitrack processing to avoid this result.  A cost-efficient and simple remedy would be 
to make multitracking mandatory. 
 48. Freedom of Information at 40, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Jul. 4, 2006), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/.  President Ford also vetoed FOIA amendments 
in 1974, but Congress overrode his veto.  Id. (“Less than 10 years later, Rumsfeld as White House 
chief of staff, and his deputy Richard Cheney, would lead President Ford’s effort to veto the 
strengthening amendments to the FOIA, but they would lose.”). 
 49. See 112 CONG. REC. 13,661 (1966) (passing the House of Representatives); 111 CONG. 
REC. 26,820-23 (1965) (passing the Senate); see also 112 CONG. REC. 13,007 (1966).  Note that 
the House of Representatives unanimously voted to enact FOIA. 
 50. Freedom of Information at 40, supra note 48.  In fact, the signing statement includes more 
about the need to keep secrets than the urgency of openness. 
 51. See History of FOIA, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (last viewed 
April 27, 2016), https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-of-foia (“[H]istory shows that 
empowering the citizenry as a check on the government has worried many members of the 
executive branch, including presidents of both parties, and reminds us that citizens must be 
constantly vigilant to protect hard-earned transparency rights.”). 
 52. Mathias, supra note 35 (“[D]ocuments—unearthed, ironically enough, by a FOIA 
lawsuit—revealed the Obama administration has actively lobbied against reforms to make the 
FOIA process stronger.”); Timm, supra note 46 (“New documents . . . reveal that the Obama 
administration—the self described ‘most transparent administration ever’—aggressively lobbied 
behind the scenes in 2014 to kill modest Freedom of Information Act reform that had virtually 
unanimous support in Congress.”); Elizabeth Williamson, White House Secrecy Starts to Give, 
WASH. POST. (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 
01/12/AR2008011202308.html (“The White House opposed the Open Government Act of 2007 
and enlisted allies in Congress to block it.”). 
 53. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Heads of All Federal Departments 
and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/ 
Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf. [hereinafter Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft]. 
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the Presidential Records Act,54 and his Attorney General, John Ashcroft, 
directed agencies in 2001 to make all discretionary FOIA disclosures only “after 
full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal 
privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure.”55  Under President 
Obama, who famously committed to create “an unprecedented level of openness 
in Government,”56 agencies set records for denying or redacting requests, 
backlogged requests increased, and the number of full-time FOIA employees 
decreased.57  Ironically, documents that were obtained via a journalist’s FOIA 
request revealed that the Obama administration played a significant role in 
defeating bipartisan FOIA reform that had widespread support, the FOIA 
Oversight and Implementation Act of 2014.58  To his credit, though, President 
Obama signed the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 into law.59 
Though agencies and presidential administrations praise FOIA and open 
government principles, they also quietly endeavor to undermine FOIA’s 
purposes.60  Rather than permit agencies and presidential administrations that 
                                                 
 54. Executive Order 13233 - Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 214 (Nov. 1, 2001); see also Executive Order 13233, AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS’N (last viewed 
Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.ala.org/offices/oif/ifissues/excutiveorder; History of FOIA, supra note 
51; Williamson, supra note 52 (“In 2001, Bush issued an executive order giving past presidents 
and their families the authority to stall release of presidential papers indefinitely.”). 
 55. Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft, supra note 53; see also Williamson, 
supra note 52 (“Attorney General John D. Ashcroft issued a memo urging government agencies to 
use whatever legal means necessary to reject requests for public documents allowed by the FOIA.”). 
 56. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1777.pdf. 
[hereinafter Memorandum from President Obama]. 
 57. Ted Bridis, Obama Administration Sets New Record for Withholding FOIA Requests, PBS 
(March 18, 2015, 3:43 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/obama-administration-sets-
new-record-withholding-foia-requests/; see also Justin Elliott, The Federal Government No Longer 
Cares About Disclosing Public Information, WASH. POST (March 11, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-federal-government-no-longer-cares-about-
disclosing-public-information/2016/03/10/7e0bf1bc-e631-11e5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e_story.html. 
 58. Leopold, supra note 46; see also FOIA OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 2014, 
H.R. REP. NO. 113–115 (Mar. 15, 2013); Timm, supra note 46. 
 59. See FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016); Timm, 
supra note 46; H.R. 1211 – FOIA Oversight and Implementation Act of 2014: General Comments 
(Dep’t of Justice 2014 Opposition to FOIA Reform) (2014), https://freedom.press/sites/ 
default/files/hr1211_memo.pdf (containing the DOJ’s general comments on the act, which stated, 
in part, that “the Administration strongly opposes the bill’s addition of a ‘foreseeable harm’ 
standard,” and that it was “premature” for a consolidated FOIA request portal). 
 60. See supra notes 51–58 & accompanying text.  It is possible that presidents do, in fact, 
desire to ensure that FOIA’s true purposes and benefits are fully realized, but other political issues 
cause “institutional flip-flopping.”  See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 
94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 485, 491–92 (2016) (arguing that institutional flip-flopping occurs as a result 
of “‘merits bias,’ a form of motivated reasoning through which short-term political commitments 
make complex and controversial institutional judgments seem self-evident (thus rendering those 
judgments vulnerable when short-term political commitments cut the other way)”).  Note also that 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently concluded an investigation of the 2016 Democratic 
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will naturally oppose meaningful FOIA modification to derail such reform 
efforts, Congress should enact precise FOIA reform measures to ensure that 
FOIA’s main goals and purposes are fully realized. 
C. De Novo Review 
FOIA’s de novo review provision is weakened by the remainder of the statute.  
The concept that an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administered is 
entitled to deference is a well-tread norm of administrative law.61  Conversely, 
de novo review is generally reserved for agency decisions and interpretations to 
which courts owe no deference.62  However, FOIA’s provisions expressly permit 
and instruct agencies to fill gaps, while also imposing de novo review on 
agencies’ exercise of such interpretive authority.63  Upon Article III review,64 
agency interpretations of FOIA, whether through rulemaking or adjudication, 
                                                 
candidate for U.S. President, Hillary Clinton, determining that although Secretary Clinton violated 
no law, she had deleted many government records contained on a private e-mail server. Statement 
by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a 
Personal E-Mail System, FBI (July 5, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases 
/statement-by-fbi-director-james-b-comey-on-the-investigation-of-secretary-hillary-clinton2019s-
use-of-a-personal-e-mail-system.  See also Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Office of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, 
827 F.3d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that FOIA applies to agency heads’ government 
records kept on private computer systems).  On the campaign trail, neither former Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton nor the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, publicly disclosed their 
FOIA views. 
 61. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (setting forth a test to 
determine when and how a court should apply deference to an agency’s construction of a statute); 
see also, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (refining Chevron deference 
for agency implementations of statutory provisions); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989) (discussing Chevron deference in the FOIA context). 
 62. Richard J. Pierce, What do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83 (2011) (“[D]e novo review refers to an approach to judicial review in which 
the court does not confer any deference on the agency . . . .”); Verkuil, supra note 13, at 688 
(“[U]nder de novo review, there should be no deference at all.”). 
 63. Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that “it is precisely 
because FOIA’s terms apply government-wide that we generally decline to accord deference to 
agency interpretations of the statute, as we would otherwise do under Chevron”); see also Kwoka, 
supra note 15, at 198 (“In prescribing de novo judicial review of agencies’ decisions to withhold 
requested information from the public under [FOIA], Congress deliberately and radically departed 
from the typical deferential treatment courts are required to give to agencies.”). 
 64. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). District courts must also review any action 
challenging an agency determination regarding fee waivers de novo. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii); see, 
e.g., Cause of Action v. FTC, 799 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  If an agency fails to respond 
to a FOIA request within the required time frame, a requester has “constructively” exhausted her 
administrative remedies and may seek immediate judicial review, again under the de novo standard. 
Id. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see 
also Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[A]n administrative appeal 
is mandatory if the agency cures its failure to respond within the statutory period by responding to 
the FOIA request before suit is filed.”). 
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should not receive deference65 because FOIA is a statute that is not organic to 
any agency.66  Due to the fact that FOIA applies to all government agencies, this 
system empowers agencies to have varying interpretations of the same 
provision.  Inconsistent FOIA implementation across the executive branch is 
inefficient and inequitable because FOIA requesters are at the mercy of 
occasionally arbitrary agency-specific interpretations of the statute, to the 
detriment of transparency.  The fact that over 100 agencies implement varying 
interpretations of ambiguous FOIA provisions in a manner that leads to 
administrative inter-decisional inconsistency further suggests that Congress 
should not employ such uncertain terms in FOIA.67 
The only practical recourse for such agency behavior is Article III review.  
Litigation can be a difficult proposition for requesters due to its expense and 
duration.  Only sophisticated and well-financed requestors have the capability to 
launch multi-year litigation that can involve successive rounds of dispositive 
motions, only to gain access to documents that have diminished news value due 
to their untimeliness.  News media challenges to FOIA denials are infrequent 
because most news media, and especially new media outlets, operate on a 
shoestring budget.68  Accordingly, non-profit organizations that are replete with 
expertise in administrative law tend to be the most effective in utilizing litigation 
to achieve judicial correction of erroneous interpretations of the statute.69 
                                                 
 65. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842 (applying Chevron deference only when “a court 
reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers”); Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 
1313 (“[H]owever, we emphasize that we owe no particular deference to the IRS’s interpretation 
of FOIA.”); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“It is true that we will not 
defer to an agency’s view of FOIA’s meaning.”). But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (directing that “a 
court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the agency’s 
determination as to” matters such as technical feasibility, reproducibility, and FOIA exemption 
determinations). 
 66. But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (requiring the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, a unit within the Executive Office of the President, to provide for a uniform schedule 
of fees that is binding on all agencies through notice and comment rulemaking). 
 67. THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP, SECOND OPEN GOVERNMENT NATIONAL 
ACTION PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Dec. 5, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/us_national_action_plan_6p.pdf (“More than 100 Federal 
agencies are subject to FOIA.”). 
 68. See generally Media Making Fewer Challenges to Government Secrecy in Federal Court, 
THE FOIA PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/03/14/media-making-fewer-chal 
lenges-to-government-secrecy-in-federal-court/ (“Newsroom budgets have been slashed so it is no 
surprise that there is less time to pursue freedom of information litigation and less willingness to 
put time into stories where government may delay responding for long beyond the statutory 
limits.”). 
 69. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, www.aclu.org (last visited May 12, 2017); 
CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE, www.causeofaction.org (last visited May 12, 2017); CITIZENS FOR 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, www.citizensforethics.org (last visited May 12, 
2017); INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, www.ij.org (last visited May 12, 2017); JUDICIAL WATCH, 
www.judicialwatch.org (last visited May 12, 2017); PUBLIC CITIZEN, www.citizen.org (last visited 
May 12, 2017); REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, www.rcfp.org (last visited 
May 12, 2017). 
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By including de novo review in FOIA, Congress intended to place primary 
authority to interpret FOIA’s provisions with the courts.70  A principal 
congressional concern regarding the precursor to FOIA was that no judicial 
review was available to challenge request denials.71  Congress determined that 
de novo review was essential to avoid courts’ “meaningless judicial sanctioning 
of agency discretion.”72  Congress considered de novo review so important to 
FOIA’s implementation that it amended the statute to supersede a Supreme 
Court decision which had ruled that in camera review of documents for national 
security exemptions was not permitted.73  In EPA v. Mink,74 the Court held that 
Congress had not intended for in camera review of an agency’s withholding of 
documents under the executive security—now the national security—exemption 
solely by requiring de novo review.75  Congress quickly amended FOIA to 
provide for in camera review in demonstration of its preference for de novo 
review.76 
D. Empirical Data 
Empirical data of Article III affirmation rates in FOIA challenges raises the 
possibility that the congressional desire for de novo review, in which courts do 
                                                 
 70. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (“Congress intended that the primary 
interpretive responsibilities rest on the judiciary, whose institutional interests are not in conflict 
with that statutory purpose.”); Kwoka, supra note 15, at 186 (“The legislative histories of the 
standards of review articulated in FOIA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) demonstrate 
that Congress acted deliberately.”). 
 71. 112 CONG. REC. 13,007 (1966) (“[M]ost important, by far the most important, is the fact 
this bill provides for judicial review of the refusal of access and the withholding of information.” 
(statement of Rep. John Moss)); 111 CONG. REC. 26,820-22 (1965) (“And, even if his reason had 
not a scintilla of validity, there is absolutely nothing that a citizen seeking information can do 
because there is no remedy available.” (statement of Sen. Mansfield)). 
 72. 111 CONG. REC. 26,823; see also CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE 
PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 9 (1966) (“The proceedings are to be de novo 
so that the court can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being restricted to judicial 
sanctioning of agency discretion.”). 
 73. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 83–84 (1973) (finding it “wholly untenable . . . that the Act intended to subject the 
soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting 
citizen.”). 
 76. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 
1562 (1974).  Congress passed the 1974 FOIA amendments over a presidential veto, in which 
President Gerald Ford stated “[T]he courts should not be forced to make what amounts to the initial 
classification decision in sensitive and complex areas where they have no particular expertise.”  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES VETOING H.R. 12471, AN ACT TO 
AMEND SECTION 552 OF TITLE 5 UNITED STATES CODE, KNOWN AS THE “FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT.” H.R. DOC. NO. 93-383 (Nov. 18, 1974).  It is possible that FOIA reversal 
rates would increase if Congress mandated that courts engage in some form of in camera review 
for all FOIA cases, rather than simply permitting courts to do so. 
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not rubber-stamp agency determinations,77 has yet to be realized.  Congress may 
have assumed that judicial outcome rates depend solely on the mandated 
standard of judicial review, with de novo review likely providing a higher 
remand and reversal rate than more deferential standards.78  This does not appear 
to be the case with FOIA litigation.  This Article contends that the structure of 
FOIA, with its various gaps that it permits or requires agencies to fill, contributes 
to lower than expected reversal rates because such structure reinforces judicial 
propensities to associate FOIA challenges to those that are more deferentially 
reviewed under the APA.79 
Reversal rates throughout the statute’s fifty-year lifespan are significantly 
lower than congressional expectations.  Scholars estimate that between FOIA’s 
enactment and 2002, district courts reversed approximately ten percent of all 
FOIA challenges, as opposed to the fifty percent hypothesized under a de novo 
standard of review.80  Professor Paul R. Verkuil determined that between 1990 
and 1999, courts reversed just over ten percent of the approximately 3,600 FOIA 
cases decided.81  Between FOIA’s enactment and 1995, the Supreme Court ruled 
negatively with respect to the requester in twenty-four out of twenty-nine FOIA 
cases.82  This sharply contrasts the forty-four percent reversal rate that Professor 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Lauren E. Baer found when analyzing all Supreme 
Court opinions employing de novo review of agency actions between 1983 and 
2005.83  This suggests a possibility that when courts review FOIA challenges, 
they may not actually be employing meaningful de novo review.84 
                                                 
 77. See H. REP. NO. 89-1497; 111 CONG. REC. 26,823 (1965). 
 78. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (“The upshot in terms of judicial review is 
some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used.”); Verkuil, supra 
note 13, at 682, 699; see also Kwoka, supra note 15, at 204 (“As the legislative history reveals, 
legislators believed that the choice of which standard of review should apply was important, 
presumably because different standards may lead to different outcomes.”). 
 79. This Article does not provide empirical data as to this point – arguably, this is a hypothesis 
that may be untestable. 
 80. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 713. 
 81. Id.  Verkuil also controlled his experiment by removing the above-average percentage of 
national security exemption cases that courts routinely affirm, but found that removing these cases 
only raises the overall reversal rate to approximately eleven percent. Id. at 715. 
 82. Id. at 715 n.165. 
 83. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1100 
(2008). 
 84. See Kwoka, supra note 15, at 185, 210 (“[E]mpirical studies demonstrate that the de novo 
review standard on the books in FOIA cases is not the standard used in practice.”); Verkuil,  supra 
note 13, at 713 (“In maintaining this modest reversal rate over such a long time and for so many 
cases, one has to ask whether the courts have ignored the de novo standard. District courts seem to 
affirm FOIA cases almost instinctively, and by so doing have produced a real world reversal rate 
that is closer to the hypothesized arbitrary and capricious standard.”). 
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FOIA reversal rates could be skewed by a number of factors.  FOIA litigation 
is rare,85 and the cases that reach district court merits determinations are greatly 
affected by a number of decisions requesters made along the way.86  Requesters 
are also at a disadvantage in that the agency is in the unique position of being 
the only party with knowledge of what the requested records contain.87  
Requesters are seldom allowed access to the traditional tools of civil discovery 
in FOIA litigation.88  The government also has a lopsided advantage of having 
superior institutional knowledge of litigating the statute, with a single agency, 
the Department of Justice, defending all FOIA challenges.  Moreover, the 
government deploys its federal courts knowledge and subject-matter expertise 
to render moot some FOIA challenges that could give rise to decisions that are 
favorable to the requester, while pressing forward with litigation that could 
provide it with favorable case law.89  Additionally, FOIA directs courts to give 
“substantial weight” to an agency affidavit concerning a denial based on 
technical feasibility, reproducibility, and most notably, exemptions.90  There is 
also the possibility that requesters do not take all of these factors into account 
when deciding to pursue FOIA litigation, and that courts are more likely to 
affirm agency FOIA determinations than other matters they review de novo 
because requesters are taking poor litigating positions.91 
The fact that FOIA reversal rates rest at approximately ten percent of decided 
cases appears to undermine congressional intent for courts not to serially 
approve agency FOIA determinations.92  To more fully effectuate the goals and 
purposes of FOIA, Congress should not only reinforce the notion that all FOIA 
determinations must be subject to searching de novo review, but also mitigate 
some of the unique factors that could be leading to below-average FOIA reversal 
rates. 
                                                 
 85. See Tai, supra note 17, at 469 (“[O]nly a very small percentage of denials are challenged 
in court: full denials range from 25,000 to 40,000, whereas cases filed are on the order of 300.”); 
see also Kwoka, supra note 15, at 206, 208 (“For example, in fiscal year 2011, 644,165 FOIA 
requests were made, with 438,638 final agency decisions, resulting in 202,164 denials in full or in 
part.  By contrast, there are consistently between 300 to 500 lawsuits filed challenging FOIA denials 
each year.”). 
 86. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 206. 
 87. See Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 959 F. Supp. 2d 175, 183 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 88. See id. (“Discovery is the exception, not the rule, in FOIA cases.”). 
 89. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 209 (“[T]he government’s strategic advantages as a repeat 
player and long-term goal of procuring favorable precedent over a short-term victory are likely to 
skew the pre-adjudication selection effect and contribute to the government’s high success rate.”). 
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
 91. See Verkuil, supra note 13, at 688–89, 713 (suggesting that one should expect fewer 
agency decisions to pass the muster of de novo review). 
 92. See CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H. REP. 
NO. 89-1497, at 9 (1966); see also 111 CONG. REC. 26,823 (1965). 
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II. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
A.  Courts are Properly Applying De Novo Review in FOIA Cases 
While this Article suggests that courts may not actually review FOIA cases de 
novo, some may argue that courts apply this standard properly and that other 
factors contribute to the unanticipated low reversal rate.  First, some argue that 
the low reversal rate could be an effect of the number of FOIA denials that are 
actually challenged in court.93 Between 2001 and 2015, requesters filed between 
300 and 500 lawsuits challenging denials per year out of the tens of thousands 
of requests made per year.94 A disproportionately small number of FOIA 
lawsuits should not contribute to the unexpectedly low reversal rate. 
Professor Margaret B. Kwoka also suggests that requesters’ decisions both 
pre- and post-filing of FOIA lawsuits skew the reversal rate.95  For instance, 
Professor Kwoka notes that many cases are voluntarily dismissed or settled 
before reaching merits determinations.96  Professor Verkuil theorizes that the 
parties take the de novo standard of review into account when deciding whether 
to litigate,97 which could influence the government’s willingness to litigate 
denials unless it is confident in its decision.98  Professor Kwoka posits that the 
government has an additional incentive to obtain favorable FOIA precedent 
because it is a repeat player in such litigation.99  These theories suggest the 
possibility that FOIA denials are only ever fully litigated, generally speaking, 
when the government is confident in its denial of the request and has a strong 
interest in defending that denial.  This would lead to a reversal rate much lower 
than the hypothesized rate. 
While these theories could explain the low reversal rate to some extent, they 
lack empirical support to explain or isolate particular causes—to be clear, this 
theory has not been empirically-tested either.  This Article agrees with these 
factors, but believe that this theory, that judicial misapplication of de novo, 
                                                 
 93. See Kwoka, supra note 15, at 208. 
 94. See David Burnham, FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record High, THE FOIA PROJECT (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://foiaproject.org/2016/01/06/foia-lawsuits-reach-record-high/; see also Tai, supra note 
17, at 469 (“[O]nly a very small percentage of denials are challenged in court: full denials range 
from 25,000 to 40,000, whereas cases filed are on the order of 300.”); Kwoka, supra note 15, at 
208. 
 95. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 206 (“Huge numbers of cases are never filed, are voluntarily 
dismissed before an adjudication, or are settled between the parties, and the outcomes of those cases 
that are adjudicated are skewed by the decisions the litigants made along the way.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 688–89. 
 98. The government may also be more confident in defending its FOIA decisions because the 
statute requires courts to give substantial weight to agency affidavits regarding denials based on 
FOIA exemptions, technical feasibility, and reproducibility.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 99. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 209 (“[T]he government’s strategic advantages as a repeat 
player and long-term goal of procuring favorable precedent over a short-term victory are likely to 
skew the pre-adjudication selection effect and contribute to the government’s high success rate.”). 
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review also contributes to low reversal rates in FOIA cases.  As suggested by 
Professor Richard Pierce, because it would be irrational for courts to ignore why 
an agency withheld requested records, courts probably do not ignore such 
reasons, and therefore, de novo review does not truly occur.100  Under this theory, 
the court is improperly applying FOIA’s de novo standard, thereby undermining 
the efficacy of its judicial review provision.101 
B.  Courts Should Not Apply De Novo Review for All Exemption Categories 
The plain language of the statute provides that a denial of a request for records 
based on any of nine exempted classes is subject to de novo review.102  However, 
Professor Verkuil argues, and aptly so, that all exemptions are not reviewed with 
the same level of strictness.103  He notes in particular that for Exemption 1 for 
national security purposes, courts tend not to review denials de novo, but rather 
under a standard more akin to “committed to agency discretion.”104  He then 
argues that Exemption 1 should instead be subjected to the arbitrary and 
capricious standard, which would “conform the review standard to reality.”105  
He summarizes that by acknowledging and codifying varying standards of 
review for the nine exemptions, the exemptions that remain subject to de novo 
review may be given a closer look under an actual non-deferential standard.106 
While this suggestion may explain why certain denials are reviewed more 
closely, its converse may also be true; some denials may be reviewed less closely 
or even not at all.  Congress expressly subjected all denials based on exemptions 
to de novo review to avoid “meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency 
discretion,” and it has continued to validate its choice by leaving the judicial 
review provision of the statute unchanged.107  Congress also amended FOIA in 
1974 to strengthen the de novo review standard in response to a Supreme Court 
case that exempted certain denials from full de novo review.108  It has repeatedly 
                                                 
 100. Pierce, supra note 62, at 96 (“The Court should acknowledge that the de novo review 
doctrine does not exist and . . . never has existed.  It would make no sense for a court to ignore 
completely an agency’s reasons for acting as it did, and I doubt that any court has actually acted in 
that irrational matter.”). 
 101. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 730 (“Unless the Court becomes interested in invigorating that 
standard, or even in acknowledging it, there is not much point for it to act.”). 
 102. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b). 
 103. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 714 (“Although the eight FOIA exemptions are all formally 
subject to the de novo review standard, some exemptions may engender stricter review than 
others.”). 
 104. Id. at 715. 
 105. Id. at 730–31. 
 106. Id. at 731 (“Moreover, by acknowledging distinctions among the exemptions in terms of 
review standards, the remaining exemptions might achieve invigorated review simply by 
comparison.  The exemptions that retain de novo review might well be given a closer look.”). 
 107. 111 CONG. REC. 26,820–23 (1965); see also CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT 
OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 9 (1966). 
 108. H. REP. NO. 93-876, at 122 (1974); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973). 
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expressed the benefits of de novo review of all denials, and it should not subject 
certain exemptions to less stringent standards simply to conform the standard to 
reality or in an attempt to achieve a higher level of review for other exemptions. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Merrick Garland’s opinion on behalf of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission has shone an 
emblematic light on the consequences of a pervasive methodological problem 
with FOIA—Congress’s failure to enact specific terms and provisions in favor 
of amending the statute in generally broad language.  Congress again missed an 
opportunity to mitigate this problem when it passed the FOIA Improvement Act 
of 2016.  Agencies have natural disincentives to liberally comply with FOIA’s 
goals and strictures because the statute is omnibus in nature and encourages 
agency transparency and oversight.  The statute’s provisions permitting or 
requiring agency interpretation are inefficient because they are internally 
inconsistent with its de novo standard of review.  Enacting more specific terms 
and provisions, thereby removing the necessity for agency interpretation, will 
cure this inconsistency and promote greater government transparency and 
oversight. 
 
